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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff and Appellee,

:

vs.

:

JAMES ALLEN DEAL and SUSAN
ANITA DEAL

:

Case No. 900434-CA

Priority No. 2

Defendants and Appellants.
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from the Circuit Court's adjudication that James A. Deal and
Susan A. Deal possessed drug paraphernalia with intent to use the same in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (1981). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Did the trial court err in denying Defendants' Motion to Suppress
Evidence when the warrant and affidavit were so lacking in indicia of probable
cause that no reasonable officer could have relied upon them in good faith. The
standard of review for denial of a motion to suppress evidence is whether the evidence taken as a whole provides a substantial basis for the finding of probable
cause. State v. Ayah, 762 P.2d 1107,1110 (Utah App. 1988); see also State v.
Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1303,1305 (Utah App. 1989).
2. Did the trial court err in denying Defendants' Motion to Disclose the
Identity of the Confidential Informant when the confidential informant's identity

was essential for Defendants to effectively prepare their defense. The standard of
review on appeal for this issue is a de novo review.
3. Was there sufficient evidence to support a finding that the Defendants
were the "possessors" of the drug paraphernalia and that they intended to use the
same. The standard of review for this issue on appeal is whether in viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the Court of Appeals finds that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the Defendants
committed the crime of which they were convicted. See State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d
591, 593 (Utah 1988).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 4,1990, a warrant was issued to search the premises of Defendants
James A. Deal and Susan A. Deal (Record1 at 3). Shortly thereafter, police officers
searched the Defendants' home and found drug paraphernalia and a plastic baggie
containing a substance that field-tested positive for methamphetamines. (R. at 68). On April 5,1990, the Fifth Judicial Circuit Court in and for Washington County
issued a two-count Information, Count 1 listing the crime of Possession of a
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a Second-degree Felony, and Count
2 listing the crime of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor.
(R. at 1).
After receiving the lab report on the white substance in the plastic baggie
found during the search, the State on its own motion moved to dismiss Count 1 of
the Information, which motion was granted on May 3,1990. (R. at 17,18, and 24).
Because the affidavit did not indicate whether the confidential informant
personally observed the alleged purchase of the methamphetamines at Defen-

1

Because the appeals of both Defendants were consolidated, Defendants refer only to the
record of Defendant James A. Deal for the sake of convenience, unless otherwise indicated. The
record is hereinafter referred to as "R."
9

dants' residence, Defendants moved the Court for an order disclosing the identity
of the confidential informant, which order was denied on June 15, 1990. (R. at 51,
53). Defendants also moved the Court for an order suppressing the drug paraphernalia seized during the search of Defendants' residence on the ground that the affidavit and warrant lacked sufficient probable cause. This motion was denied on
July 20,1990. (R. at 59; R. at 66 p. 22,23).
Defendants' trial was consolidated and held on July 20,1990. (R. at 66). The
trial court found Defendants guilty of Count 2 of the Information, Possession of
Drug Paraphernalia. Defendants were fined $200.00, and were sentenced to ten
days in jail, eight days being suspended. (R. at 59-62; Record of Susan Deal at 5558). Defendants filed their appeal from the trial court's ruling on August 9,1990.
(R. at 63; Record of Susan Deal at 59).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On April 4,1990, Officer Wendy Weston prepared an affidavit and a
search warrant to search Defendants' residence. (R. at 3, 4). In her affidavit, Officer
Weston stated that she had prior connection with a certain confidential informant
who had been reliably used on three previous occasions. (R. at 4, para. 6). According to Officer Weston, this confidential informant saw a 1/2 gram of crank
(methamphetamine) that was purchased at the Defendants' residence. (R. at 4,
para. 5).
2. Based on the statements in the affidavit of Officer Weston, Judge Richard
Dobson issued a no-knock warrant to search Defendants' residence. (R. at 3). After
the officers had searched the Defendants' home and during the trial in this matter,
it was discovered that the confidential informant never observed the purchase of
the methamphetamines at the Defendants' residence. In fact, the confidential informant merely accompanied a third party to the home of the Defendants, and
3

some time after leaving Defendants' home, the third party told the confidential informant that he purchased the methamphetamines at Defendants' residence.
(R. at 66, p. 4, 5,14,15, 21-23). All these facts were known to Officer Weston at the
time she prepared the warrant in question. (Record of Susan Deal at 62, p. 11-13).
Officer Weston knew or should have known that she was relying on the hearsay
of a third person with whom she had no prior dealings, and for whom no reliability or basis of knowledge was ever established.
3. Officer Weston utilized the warrant she obtained and act vely participated in the search of Defendants' residence. (R. at 6, 7). During the search, a plastic bag with a white powdery substance was found and field-tested immediately as
containing methamphetamines. (R. at 8). Yet, after the lab returned its report on
the powdery substance, the State on its own motion requested the Court to dismiss
Count 1 of the Information. (R. at 17,18, and 24).
4. The officers conducting the search also found items identified as drug
paraphernalia in a baseball cap hanging on the wall. (R. at 66, p. 35). The baseball
cap was one of five or six hanging on little nails on the wall in what the State
claims to be Defendants' bedroom. (R. at 66, p. 59, 60). Yet, aside from the fact that
the officers found the cap containing the drug paraphernalia in what the State
claims to be the Defendants' room, the State produced no evidence that the Defendants had possession or control of the baseball cap or the drug paraphernalia. (R.
at 36). Further, no evidence was produced at trial indicating that other occupants
of the home, such as Defendants' 17-year-old son, were excluded from entering the
room in which the baseball cap was found. (R. at 66, p. 59, 60).
5. Finally, the officers did not take the baseball cap containing the drug
paraphernalia into evidence. (R. at 66, p. 35).

4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendants argue that the warrant allowing search of Defendants' home
was defective in that it did not set forth enough facts to allow a neutral magistrate
to find probable cause for the search of Defendants' home. The State relied upon a
confidential informant in preparing the affidavit though it knew that the confidential informant never observed the purchase of the methamphetamines at
Defendants' residence, and though it knew that the confidential informant obtained her information from an unidentified third person. The State made no
showing that it had used this third person reliably in the past or that it even had
any association with this third person.
No other facts in the affidavit indicated the confidential informant's basis of
knowledge. There were no admissions against interest, self-verifying detail, or any
other facts suggesting that the confidential informant had reason to believe that
the Defendants sold this unidentified third person crank. The only thing relied on
by the confidential informant in making her allegations was the hearsay of the
unidentified third person.
Further, the State failed to show that the confidential informant, herself,
was reliable. The officer executing the warrant merely said that the confidential
informant had been used reliably in the past on three previous occasions. No
other information about these three previous occasions was listed in the affidavit,
and nothing in the affidavit indicated how, when, or where this confidential informant had been previously used.
Defendants argue that Officer Weston was aware of the problems presented
in the warrant by use of the unidentified third party, and accordingly, Officer
Weston finessed the critical language in the warrant to read "that the confidential

5

informant did personally observe 1/2 gram of crank which was purchased at Jim
Deals residence" (R. at 4, para. 5) (emphasis supplied).
Because of Officer Weston's involvement, and because of the clear deficiencies in the warrant, including a sufficient showing of reliability on the part of
the confidential informant, the officers could not have in good faith relied upon
the warrant or the affidavit in conducting the search. The evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant should, therefore, have been suppressed.
Defendants also argue that because the State relied upon this unidentified
third person in making the statements set forth in the affidavit, disclosure of the
confidential informant was critical to the Defendants' preparation for the suppression hearing. Defendants needed to show that the confidential informant relied
upon the hearsay of an unidentified third party, and that the State did not in good
faith rely upon the warrant in searching Defendants' residence. The trial court,
therefore, erred in denying Defendants' motion to disclose the identity of the confidential informant.
Finally, Defendants argue that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to show that either of them were in possession of the drug paraphernalia
with intent to use the same. The baseball cap in which the drug paraphernalia was
located was never taken into evidence. The baseball cap was hanging among five
or six other baseball caps, and the State made no showing that other parties were
excluded from the area in which the baseball cap was located. Moreover, the position of the baseball cap in relation to other objects in what the State claims to be
the Defendants' room was never established. The area in which the baseball cap
was located was a common area, not under the control of the Defendants, and the
trial court erred in finding that the Defendants were in possession of the drug
paraphernalia with intent to use the same.
6

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF THE WARRANT TO SEARCH
DEFENDANTS' RESIDENCE IS SO LACKING IN PROBABLE
CAUSE THAT THE OFFICERS COULD NOT HAVE RELIED UPON
THE WARRANT IN GOOD FAITH WHEN EXECUTING THE
WARRANT, AND THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY
FAILING TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED PURSUANT TO
THE WARRANT.
The Fourth Amendment requires that "no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized." U.S. Const, amend.
IV (emphasis supplied); See also Utah Const, art. I, § 14. The probable cause standard requires "the issuing magistrate to make a reasonable determination whether
'there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place.'" State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 56, 57 (Utah App. 1989).
On an appeal for failure to suppress evidence, "[t]he role of the reviewing court is not to conduct a 'de novo probable-cause determination,' but to determine 'whether the evidence viewed as a whole' provides a 'substantial basis'
for the finding of probable cause." State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah App.
1988). Yet, "reviewing courts will not defer to a warrant based on an affidavit that
does not 'provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause.'" State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah App. 1989)
(quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, reh,g denied , 468 U.S. 1250 (1984). If
an affidavit is so lacking in probable cause that it could not have been reasonably
relied upon by the executing officers, evidence obtained pursuant to that warrant
must be suppressed.
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A. THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT HAD NO PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE AFFIDAVIT,
AND NO OTHER FACTS OR DETAIL IN THE AFFIDAVIT
PROVIDED THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT'S BASIS OF
KNOWLEDGE.
In his concurring opinion to Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969),
Justice White noted that there are two possible ways that an informant's basis of
knowledge may be established so that a neutral magistrate may make the probable
cause determination.
If the affidavit rests on hearsay—an informant's report—what
is necessary under Aguilar is one of two things: the informant
must declare either (1) that he has himself seen or perceived
the fact or facts asserted; or (2) that his information is hearsay,
but there is good reason for believing it—perhaps one of the
usual grounds for crediting hearsay information. The first
presents few problems: since the report, although hearsay,
purports to be first-hand observation, remaining doubt centers
on the honesty of the informant, and that worry is dissipated by
the officer's previous experience with the informant. The other
basis for accepting the informant's report is more complicated.
But, if, for example, the informer's hearsay comes from one of
the actors in the crime in the nature of admission against interest,
the affidavit giving this information should be held sufficient.
Id. at 425. If the informant had personal knowledge of the facts contained in the
affidavit, no inquiry into the self-verifying detail, admission against interest or
other corroborating evidence is necessary.
Moreover, if more than one informant is relied upon to establish the
facts in the affidavit, the personal knowledge of each informant must be set forth.
As Wayne R. LaFave explained in his treatise on the Fourth Amendment,
"It is not unusual for an affidavit of a law enforcement officer
to contain hearsay information from an informant, which, in
turn, is based on other information gathered by that informant,"
and thus the judicial officer "need not categorically reject this
double hearsay information." Rather, it must be determined if
there is "sufficient information so that both levels of hearsay"
may be properly relied upon. Essentially the same approach is

called for when there is a longer chain of hearsay, as where
what informant A said to informant B was passed on to informant C who then told informant D who in turn told officer E.
Assuming officer E is the affiant or is testifying upon a motion
to suppress, his task is to show veracity and basis of knowledge
"at each level." (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted).
1. W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 3.3(d) at 668 (1987).
The affidavit in question never set forth the personal knowledge of the
confidential informant. It provided only that the informant "did personally observe 1/2 gram of crank which was purchased at Jim Deal's residence." (R. at 4,
para. 5) (emphasis supplied). From reading the affidavit, it is not clear whether
the informant ever observed the crank being purchased at the Defendants' home.
Indeed, at the suppression hearing, the State indicated that the confidential informant never entered into the Defendants' home and never observed the purchase
of the crank. The confidential informant merely accompanied a third party to the
Defendants' home, waited outside while the alleged purchase was made, and then
some time afterward was informed by the third person that he purchased crank at
the Defendants' home. (R. at 66, p. 4, 5,14,15, 21-23). No other evidence was produced at trial indicating that the informant knew that the third person obtained
the crank from the Defendants' residence. Further, the facts involving the third
person were never disclosed to the magistrate issuing the warrant though the officers were aware of those facts. Rather than disclosing those facts, the affiant,
Officer Weston, phrased the critical sentence to read that the confidential informant "did personally observe the 1/2 gram of crank which was purchased at Jim
Deal's residence" (R. at 4, para. 5) (emphasis supplied). Clearly the officer did not
conduct herself with complete candor. See State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 190,191
(Utah 1986). The simple fact is that the confidential informant had no personal
knowledge of the facts alleged in the affidavit or any facts sufficient to support a
finding of probable cause for the search of Defendants' residence.
9

Moreover, the affidavit sets forth no personal verification of the officer
executing the warrant or any other information that supports the confidential
informant's basis of knowledge. Cf. State v. Bailey, 675 R2d 1203, 1204, 1206 (Utah
1984). The only self-verifying detail mentioned in the warrant is the Defendants'
residence. Such detail is innocuous. See State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136, 140 (Wash.
1984). The detail listed in the present affidavit is even less substantial than that
relied on by the officer in Droneburg, 781 P.2d at 1304. The confidential informant
in this case simply had no personal knowledge of the facts alleged in the affidavit,
and no other facts or detail in the affidavit provided the confidential informant's
basis of knowledge.
B. THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMANT'S VERACITY AND RELIABILITY,
The confidential informant's veracity and reliability may be established
by his track record or any declaration against penal interest. Jackson, 688 P.2d at
140; 1 W. LaFave, § 3.3(b) and (c).
No facts in the affidavit even suggest that the confidential informant
made any admissions against penal interest. Neither did the State claim any such
admissions against penal interest. The only indication of the confidential informant's veracity in the entire affidavit is in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the affidavit.
Paragraph 6 provides that the confidential informant has given accurate information on three previous occasions. In paragraph 7 of the affidavit, the officer suggests that the confidential informant is reliable because the officer received
numerous reports from other confidential informants and citizens that the Defendants were dealing in crank. (R. at 4).
A mere recitation that the confidential informant was reliably used in
the past is insufficient to establish the confidential informant's veracity and reliability.

The "reliable information in the past" recital lacks any
factual indication of how reliable the informer is. The
magistrate is, in effect, relying upon the factual determination of the arresting officer that the informer is
sufficiently reliable, and not upon his own independent
judicial determination. This does not square either with
the Aguilar demand for "underlying circumstances" or with
the requirement that the essential facts supporting the
assertion of probable cause be made known to the reviewing
magistrate. Where reliability is important, the facts supporting reliability are as essential as any others to a showing
of probable cause. With such facts, the magistrate can challenge the reasonableness of the officer's belief in his informer's
reliability. When the further possibility is considered that an
officer has not made a good-faith assessment of the informer's
reliability, or may even know him to be unreliable, the
dangers in acceptance of vague averments of reliability become
even more obvious. Judicial acceptance may tempt officers to
make superficial averments of reliability without proper
support; and some officers, while they may be above wholesale fabrication, may not be averse to some stretching of the
truth on occasion. (Emphasis supplied).
1 W. LaFave, § 33(b) at 636, 637; see also State v. Bowen, 538 R2d 1336,1337 (Colo.
1975); State v. Woodall, 666 P.2d 364, 366 (Wash. 1983). See also R. at 7 (the affiant
was the officer who executed the search). Though the statement in paragraph 6
indicates how many times the confidential informant was used, it does not indicate when the confidential informant was last used or the circumstances surrounding her last use. Droneburg, 781 P.2d at 1306. The conclusory assertions of reliability in paragraph 6 are insufficient for any magistrate to determine the confidential informant's veracity and reliability.
Finally, the alleged tips from other confidential informants and citizens
in paragraph 7 of the affidavit are fraught with the very same problems that the
confidential informant's tip is faced with in paragraph 6 of the affidavit. There is
simply no showing of "how, when or where the information was obtained." No
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reasonable officer executing this warrant could have relied upon this warrant in
good faith.
C. THOUGH RIGID ADHERENCE TO THE AGUILAR SPINELLI
TEST IS NO LONGER REQUIRED, THE CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMANT'S VERACITY AND BASIS OF KNOWLEDGE
ARE STILL RELEVANT FACTORS IN DETERMINING PROBABLE
CAUSE, AND A WARRANT LACKING SUFFICIENT FACTS TO
SHOW BOTH THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS VERACITY
AND BASIS OF KNOWLEDGE CANNOT BE RELIED UPON BY
THE EXECUTING OFFICER IN GOOD FAITH.
Though the United States Supreme Court rejected the rigid Aguilar
Spinelli test in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), and though the Utah Supreme
Court has similarly rejected the rigid Aguilar Spinelli test beginning with its decision in State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1285 (Utah 1983), a showing of the confidential
informant's veracity and reliability is still relevant in the probable cause determination. State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1104 (Utah 1985) (Stewart J., dissenting);
see also Ayala, 762 P.2d at 1109; Stromberg, 783 P.2d at 57. The affidavit "must contain specific facts sufficient to support a determination by a neutrcil magistrate that
probable cause exists." Droneburg, 781 P.2d at 1304. If the magistrate merely ratifies the bare conclusions of others, he becomes a "rubber stamp" for the police. Id.
Defendants contend that the facts available to the magistrate in his probable cause determination were so lacking in any showing of the confidential informant's veracity and basis of knowledge that the magistrate could not have reasonably relied upon those facts in finding that probable cause for search of Defendants' residence existed. Moreover, no reasonable officer acting in good faith
could have relied upon this warrant in executing the search. This is especially true
since the officer executing the search was also the affiant and was aware that the
confidential informant relied solely on hearsay in making her statements.

12

Moreover, the warrant was merely a form on the officer's computer, and
it is clear from reading the warrant that not only are the facts insufficient for supplying the confidential informant's veracity and basis of knowledge, but that the
warrant is overly broad. It allows search for marijuana, cocaine and other controlled substances, and the affidavit provides that these substances may be found
on the Defendants' premises, vehicle, person, and container. (See R. at 4; R. at 66,
p.ll, 12,15-18). Although forms on a computer are helpful, the officers using
those forms must be responsible when filling them out. This warrant was simply
overly broad. See State v. Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 1985). This warrant
simply did not allow the officers searching the Defendants' residence to conduct
that search in good faith. The trial court, therefore, erred in failing to suppress the
evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant.
POINT II
DISCLOSURE OF THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT'S IDENTITY
WAS ESSENTIAL TO A FAIR DETERMINATION OF THE ISSUES
IN THIS CASE AND MATERIAL TO THE DEFENDANTS' DEFENSE;
THE TRIAL COURT, THEREFORE, COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN DENYING DEFENDANTS1 MOTION TO DISCLOSE THE IDENTITY
OF THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT.
In State v. Forshee, 611 P.2d 1222 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court
discussed the privilege of nondisclosure of an informer's identity. The Court said:
The purpose of the privilege is the furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective law enforcement.
The privilege recognizes the obligation of citizens to
communicate their knowledge of the commission of
crimes to law enforcement officials and, by preserving
their anonymity, encourages them to perform that obligation.
The scope of the privilege is limited by its underlying
purpose. Thus, where a disclosure of the contents of a
communication will not tend to reveal the identity of
an informer, the contents are not privileged. Likewise,
13

once the identity of the informer has been disclosed to
those who would have cause to resent the communication, the privilege is no longer applicable.
A further limitation on the applicability of the privilege
arises from the fundamental requirement of fairness.
Where disclosure of an informer's identity, or of contents
of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense
of an accused or is essential to a fair determination of a
cause, the privilege must give way, (Emphasis supplied).
Id. at 1224 (quoting Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957)).
In the present case, disclosure of the informant's identity was necessary
to a fair determination of this case and material to the Defendants' defense. A
close reading of paragraph 5 of the affidavit reveals that the confidential informant never observed the 1/2 gram of crank being purchased at the Defendants'
residence. It only states that she "did personally observe the 1/2 gram of crank
which was purchased at Jim Deal's residence" (R. at 4, para. 5) (emphasis supplied). Nothing in the affidavit or in the police report indicates that the confidential informant personally observed the purchase at Defendants' residence. (R. at 110). Neither does anything in the affidavit or police report indicate the circumstances surrounding the confidential informant's alleged personal observation of
the purchase of the crank. (R. at 1-10; see also Dronehurg, 781 P.2d at 1306). Given
the fact that indeed the confidential informant never observed the purchase of the
crank at the Defendants' residence, and given the fact that the confidential informant merely observed the crank in the hands of a third party who then told the
confidential informant that he purchased the crank at the Defendants' residence,
{see R. at 66, p. at 4, 5,14,15, 21-23), it was essential that the confidential informant's identity be disclosed so that the Defendants could establish that the confidential informant merely relied upon hearsay and casual rumor in making her
assertions set forth in the affidavit and so that Defendants could establish that the
14

police did not act in good faith reliance on the warrant when conducting the
search.
At the suppression hearing, Defendants had a right to establish that the
confidential informant had no idea whether the third person, before entering the
Defendants' home, was already in possession of crank. And if the confidential informant claimed that she did have such knowledge, Defendants had a right to
ascertain how she came about that knowledge: whether she searched the third
person before entering the Defendants' home, whether she merely relied upon the
third person's assurances, or whether she learned of the third person's possession
and purchase of the crank through yet another party. Defendants had a right to
this information to properly prepare for the suppression hearing, and the trial
court erred in denying Defendants' Motion to Disclose the Confidential Informant's Identity.
POINT III
THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT THAT EITHER DEFENDANT "POSSESSED" THE
DRUG PARAPHERNALIA "WITH INTENT TO USE";
DEFENDANTS' CONVICTIONS MUST THEREFORE BE
OVERTURNED.
The statute under which the Defendants were convicted provides that it
is "unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (1981); see also Addendum 3. Given that the
State presented no evidence that either Defendant actually used the drug paraphernalia, this statute requires the State to show two things: (1) possession or constructive possession of drug paraphernalia; and (2) an intention to use the drug paraphernalia. Defendants contend that the evidence on these two elements of the
crime was so lacking that, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
15

the verdict, "reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
Defendant[s] committed the crime of which they were convicted." See State v.
Cantu, 750 R2d 591, 593 (Utah 1988).
Because the Defendants did not have actual possession of the drug paraphernalia, the State may not rely on mere possession of the drug paraphernalia to
prove Defendants' intent to use the same. State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah
1985). The State must not only show that Defendants had constructive possession
of the drug paraphernalia, but the State has the additional burden of proving that
the Defendants intended to use the drug paraphernalia. Speaking about a controlled substance, the Utah Supreme Court in Fox explained the burden that the
State must meet to prove constructive possession with an intent to use.
[P]ersons who might know of the whereabouts of
illicit drugs and who might even have access to
them, but who have no intent to obtain and use
the drugs cannot be convicted of possession of a
controlled substance. Knowledge and ability to
possess do not equal possession where there is
no evidence of intent to make use of that knowledge and ability.
To find that a defendant had constructive possession of a drug or other contraband, it is necessary
to prove that there was a sufficient nexus between
between the accused and the drug to permit an
inference that the accused had both the power
and the intent to exercise dominion and control
over the drug. (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted).
Id. at 319.
The Court went on to say that whether the sufficient nexus spoken of exists depends upon the facts of each case. But it is clear that mere ownership and
occupancy "are not alone sufficient to establish constructive possession, especially
16

when occupancy is not exclusive. " Id. (Emphasis supplied). In addition to showing ownership or occupancy, one or more of the following factors must be found:
(1) incriminating statements of the accused; (2) incriminating behavior of the
accused; (3) presence of the contraband, in this case the drug paraphernalia, "in a
specific area over which the accused had control, such as a closet or drawer
containing the accused's clothing or other personal effects;" and (4) "presence of
drug paraphernalia among the accused's personal effects or in a place over which
the accused has special control." Id.
All of the cases since Fox in which either this Court or the Utah Supreme
Court found that a sufficient nexus exists between the defendant and the contraband, allowing the trier of fact to infer that the defendant intended to use the contraband, contain circumstances or facts falling into one of the four categories above.
For example, in State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court
found that the defendant possessed marijuana with an intent to use because (1) the
metal box containing the marijuana was stashed under the defendant's clothing
next to his bed, (2) the metal box was locked with a key that was found in the
Defendant's pants' pocket, (3) the defendant falsely denied possession of the key,
and (4) the defendant also had drug scales on his book shelf. Id. at 132. Also, in
State v. Phelps, 782 P.2d 196 (Utah App. 1989), this Court found that a sufficient
nexus existed because (1) the defendant was the only occupant of the home, (2) the
kitchen contained drug scales, and virtually each room of the home, including the
closets, was equipped with sophisticated lighting, hydroponic growing systems, or
otherwise used in the production of marijuana, and (3) "there was no evidence that
anyone other than defendant then resided in, or had any access to, the interior of
the home where all the marijuana production and processing was discovered." Id.
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at 198. See also State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1224 (Utah 1988).
In this case, the only evidence that the Defendants knew that the baseball cap contained drug paraphernalia, let alone that Defendants intended to use
the same, was the fact that drug paraphernalia was found in a baseball cap hanging
on the wall of what appeared to be the Defendants' master bedroom. The evidence
clearly established that the officers conducting the search had no idea whether the
baseball cap belonged to Mr. or Mrs. Deal or to their 17-year-old son. (R. at 66,
p. at 35, 60). There was no evidence that the hat did not belong to others. There
was no evidence that others did not have access to the room in which the hat was
hanging. (R. at 66, p. at 59). The cap was not even taken in as evidence. (R. at 66, p
at 35). Indeed, there were five or six baseball caps hanging next to the one containdrug paraphernalia (R. at 66, p. 60), and there was no evidence showing the juxtaposition of the hat containing the drug paraphernalia to other items belonging to
the Defendants. (R. at 66, p. at 36). Moreover, the baseball cap was clearly a man's
hat, not a woman's. (R. at 66, p. at 35). After reviewing the evidence, even the
Court found that the baseball cap was located "in a common area," not a "specific
area" over which the Defendants had control or among their "personal effects" or
another area the Defendants' "special control." (R. at 66, p. at 64); see also Fox, 709
P.2d at 319. The trial court had no evidence of the Defendants' knowledge of the
baseball cap and the drug paraphernalia other than this, and such evidence alone
will not permit reasonable minds to conclude thatt the Defendants knew the
whereabouts of the drug paraphernalia and had an intent to use them. See Id.
The trial court dismissed the possibility that the Defendants' son might
have hidden the drug paraphernalia in the baseball cap because (1) the son would
not have hidden the drugs in a place where the Defendants would have discovered them, such as Defendants' own room, and (2) there were pornographic pic18

tures in the room where the drug paraphernalia was found and it was, according
to the trial court, unlikely that the son would frequent that area. (R. at 66, p. at 63).
Yet, the son may have hidden the drug paraphernalia anywhere in the home, and
the parents may have found it. The fact that the son hid the drug paraphernalia
among the other baseball caps is simply more evidence that that area was a common area. Further, this situation does not present a catch 22 for the Defendants as
the trial court suggests. (R. at 66, p. at 63). Even if the son hid the drug paraphernalia where the parents knew about them, that does not mean that the parents
possessed the drug paraphernalia. The evidence of possession "must raise a reasonable inference that the defendant was engaged in a criminal enterprise and not
simply a bystander" Id, at 320. (Emphasis supplied). Mere knowledge is not
enough to show possession.
Further, it is "sufficiently inconclusive," "inherently improbable," and
highly speculative that the son did not hide the drug paraphernalia among the
other baseball caps simply because there were pornographic pictures in the room.
See Cantu, 750 P.2d at 593. This is especially so since there was no evidence showing the juxtaposition of the baseball caps to the pornographic pictures.
(R. at 66, p. at 36).
Finally, there was no evidence of incriminating statements or incriminating behavior of either of the Defendants before, during, or after the search. The
only evidence before the trial court of what happened during the search is that
after the police entered the home, Defendant James Deal exited the room containing the baseball cap, (R. 66, p. 32), and that the Defendants refused to talk to the
police officers during and after the search. (R. 66, p. 57).
This case is unlike Hansen, unlike Phelps, and unlike Watts.

19

Even viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, it is clear that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the Defendants committed
the crime of which they were convicted. See Cantu, 750 P.2d at 593.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request this Court to find
that the trial court erred in failing to grant Defendants' Motion to Suppress, that
the trial court erred in failing to grant Defendants1 Motion to Disclose the Confidential Informant's Identity, and that the trial court erred in finding that Defendants possessed the drug paraphernalia with the intent to use the same. Accordingly, Defendants ask this Court to reverse their convictions.
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fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.

AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT VII
AMENDMENTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS]
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVI

[Trial by j u r y in civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

AMENDMENT I
[Religious and political freedom.]
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.

AMENDMENT VIII
[Bail — P u n i s h m e n t . ]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.

A M E N D M E N T II
[Right to b e a r arms.]
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary' to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

AMENDMENT IX
[Rights r e t a i n e d by people.]
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.

A M E N D M E N T III
[Quartering soldiers.]
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in
time of war. but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

AMENDMENT X
[Powers reserved to states or people.]
The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

A M E N D M E N T IV
fUnreasonable s e a r c h e s a n d
seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.

AMENDMENT XI
[Suits against states — Restriction of j u d i c i a l
power.]
The judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — P r o v i s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g —
Due p r o c e s s of law a n d j u s t c o m p e n s a t i o n
clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use. without just compensation.
A M E N D M E N T VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by lav.. and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-

AMENDMENT XII
[Election of President and Vice-President.]
The Electors shall meet in their respective states,
and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President,
one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of
the same state with themselves; they shall name in
their ballots the person voted for as President, and in
distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons
voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each,
which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit
sealed to the seat of the Government of the United
States, directed to the President of the Senate;—The
President of the Senate shaU, in the presence of the
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the
certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The
person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and
if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three
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Art. I, * 9

ia) pe^ons charged with a capital offense
when there is substantial evidence to support the
charge or
lb> persons charged with a felonv while on probation or parole, or while free on bail awaiting
trial on a previous felonv charge, when there is
substantial evidence to support the new felonv
charge, or
\c\ persons, charged v*\\h & cnme, as defined b \
statute, when there is substantial evidence to
support the charge and the court finds bv clear
and convincing evidence that the person would
constitute a substantial danger to self or anv
other person or to the communitv or is hkeh to
flee the jurisdiction of the court if released on
bail
(21 Person^ convicted of a crime are bailable pend
ing appeal onlv as prescribed bv law
IMM
Sec. 9.

{Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments. 1
Excessive bail shall not be required excessive fines
shall not be imposed nor shall cruel and unusual
punishments be inflicted Persons arrested or impris
oned shall not be treated with unnecessarv rigor
18%

S e c . 10. I T r i a l b> jur> )
In c a p i t a l case^ t h e r i g h t of t r i a l bv j u r \ shall n
m a i n i n v i o l a t e In c o u r t s of g e n e r a l jurisdiction ex
cept in c a p i t a l cases a i u r \ shall consist of eight ju
r o r s In c o u r t s of inferior jurisdiction a j u r v shall con
sist of four j u r o r s In c r i m i n a l cases t h e verdict shall
be u n a n i m o u s In civil c a s e s t h r e e - f o u r t h ^ of t h e ju
r o r s m a v find a verdict A j u r v in civil cases shall be
waived unless demanded
1896

Sec. 11. (Courts open — Redress of injuries.1
All courts shall be open, and every person for an
injurv done to him in his person, propertv or reputa
tion. shall have remedy by due course of law which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary
delay, and no person shall be barred from prosecuting
or defending before anv tribunal in this State, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a
party
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

1896

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and b> counsel,
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a copy thereof to testify in his
own behalf to be confronted bv the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy
public trial bv an impartial jurv of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed and the right to appeal in all cases In no
instance shall anv accused person, before final judgment be compelled to advance monev or fee^ to se
cure the rights herein guaranteed The accused shall
not be compelled to give evidence against himself, a
wife shall not be compelled to te-tih against her husband nor a husband against hi* wiie nor shaN anv
person be twice put in leopardv for the same offense

the consent of the State, or bv indictment, with or
without such examination and commitment The formation of the grand )ury and the powers and duties
thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature
1949

Sec. 14.

[Unreasonable searches forbidden —
Issuance of warrant.]

T h e r i g h t of t h e people to be secure in t h e i r persons, h o u s e s , p a p e r * a n d eflects a g a i n s t u n r e a s o n a b l e
s e a r c h e s a n d s e i z u r e s s h a l l not be violated, a n d no
w a r r a n t s h a l l i s s u e b u t u p o n probable c a u s e supported by o a t h or a f f i r m a t i o n p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s c r i b i n g
t h e place to be s e a r c h e d , a n d t h e person or t h i n g to be
seized
1896

Sec. 15.

| F r e e d o m of speech and of the press —
Libel.]
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the
freedom of speech or of the pre&» In all criminal prosecutions for libel the truth mav be given in evidence
to the jury, and if it shall appear to the jurv that the
matter charged a* libelous is true, and was published
with good motive* and for justifiable ends, the partv
shall be acquitted and the iurv shall have the right
to determine the law and the fac t
1896
Sec. 16.

(No i m p r i s o n m e n t for debt — Exception I
There shall bt no imprisonment for debt except in
ca^es of absconding debtors
1896
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting ]
All elections shall be free and no power civil or
military, shall at anv time interfere to prevent the
free exercise of the right of suffrage Soldiers, in time
of war, may vote at their post of dutv in or out of the
State, under regulations to be prescribed by law
1896

Sec. 18.

[Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing contracts.]
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed
1896

Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.]
Treason against the State shall consist only in
levying war against it, or in adhering to its enemies
or in giving them aid and comfort No person shall be
convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two
witnesses to the same overt act
ime
Sec. 20.

[Military
power.]

subordinate

to

the

civil

T h e m i l i t a r y s h a l l be in s t r i c t s u b o r d i n a t i o n to t h e
civil power, and n o s o l d i e r in t i m e of peace, s h a l l be
q u a r t e r e d in a n y h o u s e w i t h o u t t h e consent of t h e
o w n e r , n o r in t i m e of w a r except in a m a n n e r to be
prescribed bv law
1896

Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden ]
Neither slaverv nor involuntarv servitude except
as a punishment for crime whereof the partv shall
have been dulv convicted shall exist within this
State
18%

1896

Sec. 22.
Sec. 13

| P r o s e c u t i o n b \ information or indictment — G r a n d jurv i
Offenses heretoiore required to be prosecuted bv
indictment, shall be prosecuted bv information after
examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be waived by the accused with

[Private propertv for public use.]

P r i v a t e p r o p e r t v ^hali not be t a k e n or d a m a g e d for
public use w i t h o u t ju-a c o m p e n s a t i o n
1896

Sec. 23.

[Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]

N o law s h a l l b e p a s s e d g r a n t i n g irrevocably a n y
franchise, p r i v i l e g e or i m m u n i t y
1896

58-37a-4

OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS

90

<j» Air-driven pipes;
"Drug paraphernalia" means any equipment,
ik' Chillums;
product, or material used, or intended for use, to
(11 Bongs: and
plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manuimi Ice pipes or chillers.
1981
facture, compound, convert, produce, process,
prepare, test, analyze, package, repackage, store,
58-37a-4. Considerations
in
determining
contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or to othwhether object is d r u g p a r a p h e r n a l i a .
erwise introduce a controlled substance into the
In deterrcus\u\£ whether an object \^ drug parapherhuman bady \n v\a\al\c>T> <tf ChapteT Zl, T\i\e &8>,
nalia, the trier of fact, in addition to all other logiand includes, but is not limited to:
cally relevant factors, should consider:
(1) Kits used, or intended for use. in plant(1) statements by an owner or by anyone in
ing, propagating, cultivating, growing, or
control of the object concerning its use;
harvesting any species of plant which is a
(2) prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of
controlled substance or from which a conanyone in control of the object, under any state or
trolled substance can be derived;
federal law relating to a controlled substance;
(21 Kits used, or intended for use, in man(3) the proximity of the object, in time and
ufacturing, compounding, converting, prospace, to a direct violation of this chapter;
ducing, processing, or preparing a controlled
substance.
(4) the proximity of the object to a controlled
substance;
(31 lsomerization devices used, or intended for use. to increase the potency of any
(5) the existence of any residue of a controlled
species of plant which is a controlled subsubstance on the object:
stance;
(61 instructions whether oral or written, pro(41 Testing equipment used, or intended
vided with the object concerning its use;
for use. to identify or to analyze the strength,
(7) descriptive materials accompanying the obeffectiveness, or purity of a controlled subject which explain or depict its use;
stance:
(8) national and local advertising concerning
(5» Scaie> and balances used, or intended
its use:
for use. in weighing or measuring a con(9 < the manm : in which the object is displayed
trolled substance;
for sale:
(61 Diluents and adulterants, such a^ qui(10> whether the owner or anyone in control of
nine hydrochloride, mannitol. mannited,
the object is a legitimate supplier of like or redextrose and lactose, used, or intended for
lated items to the community, such as a licensed
use to cut a controlled substance;
distributor or dealer of tobacco products;
ili Separation gins and sifters used, or in(11) direct or circumstantial evidence of the
tended for use to remove twigs, seeds, or
ratio of sales of the object to the total sales of the
other impurities from marihuana;
business enterprise.
(81 Blenders, bowls, containers, spoons
(12) the existence and scope of legitimate uses
and mixing devices used, or intended for use
of the object in the community; and
to compound a controlled substance;
(13) expert testimony concerning its use 1981
(9> Capsules, balloons, envelopes, and
other containers used, or intended for use to
58-37a-5. Unlawful acts.
package small quantities of a controlled sub(1) It is unlawful tor any person to use, or to posstance;
sess with intent to use. drug paraphernalia to plant,
(10) Containers and other objects used, or
propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture,
intended for use to store or conceal a concompound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test,
trolled substance,
analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject,
(11) Hypodermic syringes, needles, and
ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled subother objects used, or intended for use to parstance into the human body in violation of this chapenteral ly inject a controlled substance into ter. Any person who violates this subsection is guilty
the human body; and
of a class B misdemeanor.
(12) Objects used, or intended for use to
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess
ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce marihuana, cocaine, hashish, or hashish oil into with intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to
deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the
the human body, including but not limited
drug paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate,
to:
cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound,
(ai Metal, wooden, acrylic, glass,
convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze,
stone, plastic, or ceramic pipes with or
pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest,
without screens, permanent screens.
inhale, or otherwise introduce a controlled substance
hashish heads, or punctured metal
into the human body in violation of this act. Any
bowls:
person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class
(b» Water pipes;
A misdemeanor
vc* Carbureters tubes and devices,,
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers
(d> Smoking and carburetion masks;
drug paraphernalia to a person under 18 years of age
(e> Roach clips: meaning objects used
who is three years or more younger than the person
to hold burning material, such as a marmaking the delivery is enilty of a third degree felony.
ihuana cigarette, that has become too
(4) It is unlawful tor any person to place in this
small or too short to be held in the hand.
state in any newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other
if1 Miniature cocaine spoons and copublication any advertisement. X owing that the
caine vials;
purpose of the advertisement is to i mote the sale of
(g Chamber pipes;
drug paraphernalia. Any person ho violates this
(h ! Carburetor pipes;
subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
1961
(i) Electric pipes;

